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NOTES
CHALLENGING NEW YORK GRAND JURY
COMPOSITION: THE BARRIER OF THE
"SYSTEMATIC AND INTENTIONAL
EXCLUSION" REQUIREMENT
I. Introduction
Commentators have criticized the grand jury system, of New York
and other states,' as "an alter ego of the prosecutor ' 2 and "an ad-
ministrative arm of the office of the public prosecutor."' 3 Its critics
argue that it has not fulfilled its historical function, which is to serve
as a buffer between an accused citizen and an overzealous, mis-
taken, or politically motivated prosecutor.' Although commentators
cite many reasons for its supposed failings,' they frequently note the
apparent racial, sexual, and class discrimination in the selection of
the grand jurors.
In a recent Hastings Law Journal article, Professor Jon Van Dyke
concluded: "The grand juries of the most populous state in the east
[New York] are selected through a conscious and sophisticated
attempt to gather together the most established people of the com-
1. Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indictment vs. Prosecution by Information, 25
Hastings L.J. 997 (1974); Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
174 (1973); Johnston, The Grand Jury-Prosecutorial Abuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 157 (1974); Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the
Grand Jury, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 701 (1972); Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of
the People or Administrative Agency of the Prosecutor?, 2 N. M. L. Rev. 141 (1972); Van
Dyke, The Grand Jury, Representative or Elite?, 28 Hastings L. J. 37 (1976); See also
Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 26 (1955) for an
overview of earlier criticisms of grand juries.
2. Campbell, supra note 1 at 178-79.
3. Shannon, supra note 1 at 146.
4. Helene Schwartz found one of the primary reasons for that failure was that "most grand
jurors are white, middle class men, conservative in outlook and with little concern for protect-
ing the rights of their fellow citizens." Supra note 1 at 759. In his article, James Shannon,
supra note 1, profiles several grand jury investigations, including the Kent State shootings
and the deaths of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, to illustrate his thesis that the grand jury
has become so identified with the prosecution that it should be eliminated.
5. In their recent book, THE GRAND JURY (1977), Marvin P. Frankel and Gary P. Naftalis
discuss problems in the federal grand jury system, including: harassment of citizens, the
absence of counsel for witnesses, the possibility of self-incrimination, and information leaks.
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munity." He found that the selection procedure resulted in "the
virtually total exclusion of non-whites and the poor, and the abso-
lute exclusion of the young."7
The most frequent challenges to the composition of the grand jury
have focused on exclusions of racial minorities and women, although
some panels have been challenged for religious and age discrimina-
tion.8
This Note will examine the statutory law which provides for a
grand jury in New York, the background of federal constitutional
requirements, and New York court decisions which have interpreted
the statutes when defendants or witnesses have challenged a grand
jury for failing to conform to "the very idea of a jury," which is a
body "composed of the peers or equals of the persons whose rights
it is selected or summoned to determine; . his neighbors, fellows,
associates . .. ."0
II. Grand Jury Independence
New York's first grand jury assembled in 1681.1 Like most United
States legal institutions, it was derived from English common law. "
The grand jury had a particular appeal to the colonists because it
was viewed traditionally as a protection against the British authori-
ties' arbitrary enforcement of the law. Any proposed indictment
would have to be screened by a panel of citizens" who would exam-
ine the charges and determine whether to issue an indictment (true
bill). 3
In 1681, the cases of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, and Stephen
Colledge, established the grand jury's reputation as "protector
against unfounded charges and oppressive government."' 4 When
Charles II of England tried to indict the two Protestants who op-
posed his attempt to reestablish the Catholic Church, the grand jury
in England refused to issue the true bill."
6. Van Dyke, supra note 1 at 54-55.
7. Id. at 55.
8. See note I supra.
9. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
10. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 334 (1944).
11. 1I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORv OF ENGLISH LAW 649 (2d ed. 1959).
12. L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 16 (1975).
13. Id.
14. Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 5 at 9-10.
15. Id.
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There have been several especially well known historic examples
of New York's grand jurors' independence. In 1735 grand jurors
twice refused to indict John Peter Zenger for libel after he had
scorned the Royal Governor in his Weekly Journal. 6 Again, in 1872,
a grand jury exposed the political corruption of New York City's
Tweed Ring. 7 More recently, Special Prosecutor Thomas E.
Dewey's investigation of organized racketeering was facilitated by
another vigorous New York County grand jury. 8
III. The Grand Jury in New York Today
New York's state constitution and statutes set out the authority
of grand juries." The state constitution provides: "No person shall
be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime .. .
unless on indictment of a grand jury .. 20 but the selections,
qualifications, and duties of the grand jurors are detailed in the
criminal procedure and judiciary laws.2'
A. Selection
Because New York grand juries consist of volunteers from the list
of petit, or trial, jurors,'their qualifications are the same.Y Jurors
must be United States citizens and county residents, aged 18-75,
without physical infirmities, and of good character.2 3 They must
understand English, and be free from a conviction of a misdemeanor
16. Clark, supra note 12 at 18; See also G. J. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 32 (1906).
17. Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 5 at 15.
18. Clark, supra note 12 at 29.
19. People v. Stern, 3 N.Y.2d 658, 661, 148 N.E.2d 400, 401, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (1958);
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 190 (McKinney 1971); N.Y. JUD. LAW §§
531, 609, 684 (McKinney 1975).
20. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
21. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 190 (McKinney 1971); N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 531, 609, 684
(McKinney 1975).
22. People v. Mincey, 81 Misc. 2d 407, 411-12, 365 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705-06 (Sup. Ct. 1975);
People v. Henry, 55 Misc. 2d 134, 134-35, 284 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (Dutchess County Ct. 1967).
23. N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 504, 596, 662 (McKinney 1975). One New York court has interpreted
"physical infirmities" in connection with "the practical duties and responsibilities" of jurors.
Therefore, a blind man was disqualified because his blindness would place limitations on his
evaluation of physical evidence. Lewinson v. Crews, 28 App. Div. 2d 111, 113, 282 N.Y.S.2d
83, 84-85 (2d Dep't 1967), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 898, 236 N.E.2d 853, 289 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1968). The
"good character" requirement was challenged as unconstitutional in People v. Ferguson, 55
Misc. 2d 711, 286 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. 1968). The court upheld the standard as long as it
was not used as a device for eliminating any particular group from the jury roster. Id. at 720,
286 N.Y.S.2d at 981-83.
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involving moral turpitude or a felony." The names of potential trial
jurors are usually selected from the county's voter registration lists,
although other sources of names including telephone directories,
city directories, census reports, and assessment lists are permitted. 5
Qualified trial jurors who choose to volunteer-are then placed on
a list of potential grand jurors. Names are publicly drawn at ran-
dom whenever vacancies arise or new grand juries are impanelled.27
B. How the Grand Jury Functions
Grand juries are allowed to initiate investigations into official
corruption, and individual members are required to bring to the
attention of the grand jury any criminal activities about which they
have personal knowledge."' But, as a practical matter, the prosecu-
tor usually initiates an investigation in routine criminal cases.29 It
is the grand jury, however, and not the prosecutor, that has the
power to compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of evidence. Ultimately, the grand jury votes for a true
bill, or indictment, if it believes a prosecution is justified. 31
The grand jury's powers are extensive and its proceedings are
carried on in secret. 3' A grand jury can subpoena a witness, and if
the witness should refuse to testify, it can grant immunity to compel
the witness' testimony about a prospective defendant.32 If the wit-
24. People v. Ferguson, 55 Misc. 2d at 715-16, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 982 gives the following
examples of felonies and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude: tampering with a witness,
tampering with a juror, or misconduct of a juror.
25. N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 503, 594, 658 (McKinney 1975).
26. See People v. Kessler, 81 Misc. 2d 492, 493-95, 365 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948-49 (Dutchess
County Ct. 1975) for a detailed discussion of the selection process.
27. Because "the county clerk is under no affirmative duty to inform the members of the
petit jury that they may volunteer for service on the grand jury," People v. Mincey, 81 Misc.
2d at 413, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 708, one judge upheld an indictment issued by a grand jury which
the county clerk had personally selected from the petit jury list. Id. at 408, 365 N.Y.S.2d at
704.
28. People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383, 391-92, 79 N.E. 330, 333 (1906).
29. Johnston, The Grand Jury-Prosecutorial Abuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 157, 160-61 (1974); Lumbard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and
The Grand Jury, 39 N. Y. St. Bar J. 397, 399 (1967).
30. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; see generally Lumbard, supra note 29.
31. N.Y. CalM. Paoc. LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 1971). The usual reasons given for
maintaining grand jury secrecy are: insuring the grand jury the fullest opportunity to investi-
gate thoroughly, preventing the flight of an accused, preventing any tampering with wit-
nesses, and protecting the reputations of persons who are investigated but never indicted.
United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628 (3d Cir. 1954).
32. There are two types of immunity which may be granted, transactional or use.
(Vol. VI
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ness refuses to testify, he can be cited for contempt and jailed for
the duration of the grand jury's term.3 Neither the witness nor the
prospective defendant is permitted to have an attorney present in
the grand jury room, although an attorney can wait nearby and be
consulted at any time. 4 The prosecutor who conducts the investiga-
tion is considered the legal advisor to the grand jury and performs
ministerial functions under its direction.35 The district attorney
"informs the jurors of the complaint against the defendant, advises
them on matters of law, examines witnesses, issues subpoenas,
draws the indictment and, in general, shapes the tone of the case.""
Because the grand jury's powers are so broad, and because it has
absolute control over the indictment process in New York, defen-
dants and witnesses before the grand jury consider it vital that the
grand jury system continue to include, "a group of men and women
who represent a fair and impartial cross-section of the citizens of the
county; each one with his or her own individual thoughts, experi-
ences and reactions.3 7
IV. Federal Constitutional Requirements
Thomas Jefferson believed the grand jury to be "the true tribunal
of the people," and provided for the requirement of grand jury
"[T]ransactional immunity protects against prosecution for any of the transactions or oc-
currences that are subjects of the compelled testimony. Use immunity forbids only later use
against the witness of either the evidence he has been forced to give or evidence derived from
his testimony." M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 77 (1977).
33. The New York statute does not specify the length of the grand jury's term. Instead,
it merely provides for its "existence at least until and including the opening date of the next
term of such court for which a grand jury has been designated" and permits extensions when
necessary. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.15 (McKinney 1971).
34. Although some states have begun to allow witnesses to have the assistance of counsel
in the grand jury room, see, e.g., McMorrow-Love, Juries and Jurors: The Right to Counsel
In the Oklahoma Grand Jury, 29 Okla. L. Rev. 967 (1976), the great majority, including New
York, still prohibit the practice. See People v. Waters, 27 N.Y.2d 553, 555, 261 N.E.2d 265,
266, 313 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (1970); People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 288
N.Y.S.2d 462 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968) explained that the purpose of this rule
is to preserve grand jury secrecy. Id. at 423-24, 235 N.E.2d at 442-43, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
35. People ex. rel. Van der Beek v. McCloskey, 18 App. Div. 2d 205, 208, 238 N.Y.S.2d
676, 680-81 (1st Dep't 1963); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.55 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1976-
77) details the duties of the district attorney in a grand jury proceeding.
36. An Examination of the Grand Jury in New York, 2 Colum. J. of L. and Soc. Prob. 88,
97 (1966). It is always important, though, to distinguish its formal powers from actual prac-
tice. See text accompanying notes 28-30, supra, for a discussion of this distinction.
37. In re Grand Jurors Ass'n, Bronx Co., New York, Inc., 25 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
38. S. K. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 128 (1943).
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indictment in the Bill of Rights, 9 However, the right of indictment
by a grand jury, unlike most other provisions in the Bill of Rights,
has not been extended to citizens in all states.'"
In Hurtado v. California4 the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause did not require
a grand jury indictment for a felony prosecution.2 The Court ex-
plained that there was no specific language in that amendment to
indicate that its purposes was to extend the grand jury system to
all states. 3
The Supreme Court has allowed individual states great latitude
in choosing whether or not to use the grand jury,44 and has permitted
a variety of selection procedures when a grand jury is required."
However, the Court has insisted that there are two essential rights
which must be protected: the defendant's right to be indicted by a
grand jury which is "truly representative of the community,"" and
the citizen's right to participate in this judicial procedure. 7
The first cases which arose in the Supreme Court challenging
indictments by grand juries involved the exclusions of minorities,
especially of black citizens in Southern states. In Strauder v. West
Virginia, the Court declared that a statute which excluded blacks
from any form of jury service was unconstitutional under the equal
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. Van Dyke, The Grand Jury: Representative or Elite?, 28 Hastings L.J. 37, 40-41
(1976).
41. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
42. Id. at 538. California's information system "is merely a preliminary proceeding,'and
can-result in no final judgment, except as the consequence of a regular judicial trial, con-
ducted precisely as in cases of indictments."
43. Id. at 535.
44. Id. at 538. For a discussion of the different indictment procedures in New York,
California, and Texas see Van Dyke, supra note 40. For a comparison between prosecution
by information and prosecution by indictment, see Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indict-
ment vs. Prosecution by Information, 25 Hastings L. J. 997, 1004 (1974).
45. "It has long been accepted that the Constitution does not forbid the States to pre-
scribe relevant qualifications for their jurors." Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene Co., 396 U.S.
320, 332 (1970), citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 473 (1953); see also Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282 (1950), Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
46. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
47. As the United States Supreme Court explained, "People excluded from juries because
of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system
of racial exclusion." 396 U.S. at 329.
48. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."9 The Court ex-
plained: "It is well known that prejudices often exist against partic-
ular classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors,
and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of
those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others
enjoy." 5 This reasoning was implicit in later decisions which de-
clared unconstitutional statutes which were nondiscriminatory on
their face, but in practice produced totally or substantially segre-
gated juries."
After defendants had successfully challenged grand juries for ra-
cial exclusions, they began to challenge indictments from grand
juries which excluded women.2 Using the same rationale in these
cases as it had in cases involving racial discrimination, the Court
has extended the fourteenth and sixth amendments' protections to
women. 53 If there were a systematic exclusion from the grand jury
on the basis of sex or race the indictment will be invalidated,5" and
it is not necessary for the party alleging discrimination to be a
member of the excluded class.55
A de facto grand jury56 is presumed to hand down valid indict-
ments. 7 To successfully challenge the indictment on the grounds
that it was the product of a non-representative panel, a defendant
49. 100 U.S. at 310.
50. Id. at 309.
51. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) and Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935). These cases involved Texas and Alabama statutes which were nondiscriminatory on
their face, i.e. they did not explicitly exclude blacks as the West Virginia statute contested
in Strauder had. However, because no blacks had ever served on the grand juries of those
states, the United States Supreme Court found those statutes to be unconstitutional.
52. Tayldr v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946).
53. "If the fair-cross-section rule is to govern the selection of juries, as we have concluded
it must, women cannot be systematically excluded from jury panels from which petit juries
are drawn." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 533.
54. "[T]he jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn
must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be
reasonably representative thereof." Id. at 538.
55. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), a white man successfully challenged a grand
jury which excluded blacks; in Taylor the defendant was male.
56. For a more complete discussion of de facto grand juries in New York, see notes 64-66,
infra and accompanying text.
57. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919), where the Court stated that the petitioner
was "not entitled to challenge the authority of the . ..grand jury, provided [it has] a de
facto existence and organization." Id. at 282.
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must show (1) a substantial mathematical difference between the
general population of the area and the excluded group of potential
jurors over a period of time;5" and (2) an independent factor which
would demonstrate that the disparity was the result of purposeful
discrimination." By establishing these two elements, the petitioner
presents a prima facie case which must be rebutted to uphold the
indictment.2
Although a defendant, and the entire community, is entitled to a
grand jury open to all members of the community, the Supreme
Court has been careful to caution that every defendant is not neces-
sarily entitled to a particular jury with any fixed ratios of persons."
Mere mathematical differences in any given grand jury will not
invalidate an indictment unless, in addition, there is "the opportun-
ity for discrimination" in some aspect of the grand jury selection
process."
V. New York Common Law Challenging a Grand Jury's
Composition
The New York Court of Appeals has applied narrowly the United
States Supreme Court decisions in cases where grand juries have
58. "This Court has never announced mathematical standards for the demonstration of
'systematic' exclusion of blacks but has, rather, emphasized that a factual injury is necessary
in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors." Alexander v, Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972). Although the Court has never stated a given proportional disparity
that would conclusively establish discrimination, recent cases challenging grand juries have
involved substantial discrepancies in the ratio of population of the area to the representation
of a particular minority group on the grand jury panel. The following examples illustrate
ratios which the Court has found to be indicative of discrimination: 21%:6.75%, Id. at 627-
28; 65%:32%, Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene Co., 396 U.S. 320, 327-28; 79%:45.5%, Casta-
neda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1276 (1977).
59. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945).
60. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), and Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346
(1970), are two examples. In Alexander 21.06% of the county's population was black, com-
pared to only 6.75% of the available grand jury venire. By showing this disparity, combined
with a grand jury eligibility questionnaire which indicated the applicant's race, the peti-
tioner made out a prima facie case. Because the respondent failed to sustain the burden of
proof, petitioner's indictment was overturned. The racial disparity between the general popu-
lation and the grand jury lists in Turner was 60% and 37%, respectively. By showing that
the jury commissioners subjectively eliminated blacks as "unintelligent" or not "upright"
(96% of the prospective jurors rejected for that reason were black) the petitioner successfully
challenged his indictment.
61. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. at 403.
62. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 360 provides the example of jury commissioners whose
personal subjective judgments determined the final grand jury lists.
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been challenged for failing to represent a "fair cross section of the
community." 3
New York courts presume that any grand jury is validly consti-
tuted and conforms to state statutory requirements. 4 If any proce-
dural defect is discovered, the courts have evinced great reluctance
to overturn an indictment because of "mere technicalities"6 unless
there has been demonstrable prejudice to the defendant."
People v. Dessaure7 is the precedent for all modern New York
cases alleging that a grand jury does not represent certain classes
in a community. In Dessaure, the Court of Appeals articulated the
test for a successful challenge: was the absence of any group from
the grand jury panel the result of "systematic and intentional"
discrimination?68
Dessaure arose when there was exclusion of a particular group
from the jury roster.6 In Dessaure, a black man challenged a Nassau
County grand jury for discrimination because the questionnaire for
grand jury service required applicants to indicate "color" and be-
cause for at least ten years no black had ever served on the county's
grand jury.70 The judge accepted the jury commissioner's explana-
tion that "color" was used only for identification purposes when the
application was reviewed,7 and found that the absence of blacks
63. See People v. Chestnut, 26 N.Y.2d 481, 260 N.E.2d 501, 311 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1970);
People v. Agron, 10 N.Y.2d 130, 176 N.E.2d 556, 218 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 922 (1961); People v. Dessaure, 299 N.Y. 126, 85 N.E.2d 900 (1949), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 949 (1949); People v. Prior, 294 N.Y. 405, 63 N.E.2d 8 (1945).
64. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.20(2), 210.35 (McKinney 1971). The procedural reasons
include: where the proceeding is before less than sixteen grand jurors (210.35(2)), if less than
twelve grand jurors vote to indict (210.35(3)), if the target of the investigation is not given
an opportunity to appear (210.35(2)), or if the grand jury's integrity is "impaired and preju-
dice to the defendant may result" (210.35(5)). See also People v. Cohen, 54 Misc.2d 873, 880,
283 N.Y.S.2d 817, 826 (Sup. Ct. 1967); People v. Thomas, 53 Misc.2d 427, 428, 278 N.Y.S.2d
1003, 1005 (Onondaga County Ct. 1967).
65. People v. Block, 190 Misc. 78, 82, 74 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (Madison County Ct. 1947).
66. Examples of technical improprieties which the courts found not to be prejudicial to
the defendant include People v. Brophy, 304 N.Y. 391, 395, 107 N.E.2d 504, 505 (1952), where
the grand jury was drawn in the county clerk's office instead of the courtroom as the former
Code of Criminal Procedure required; and People v. Block, 190 Misc. at 79, 74 N.Y.S.2d at
431, where one grand juror's name had not appeared on the county assessment role as a
provision in the former Judiciary Law required.
67. 299 N.Y. 126, 85 N.E.2d 900 (1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 949 (1949).
68. Id. at 131, 85 N.E.2d at 902.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 129-30, 85 N.E.2d at 901.
71. Id. at 130, 85 N.E.2d at 901.
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from the past grand juries could be explained by the small ratio of
blacks to whites, three to one hundred, in the county."2 Despite two
strong dissents,73 Dessaure established the New York rule that un-
less a defendant could prove that a given group had been
''systematically and intentionally" excluded from the grand jury,
the challenge would fail.74
A. People v. Chestnut
People v. Chestnut,"5 is the most recent New York Court of Ap-
peals decision involving a challenge to the composition of a grand
jury. Six witnesses who were cited for contempt for refusing to tes-
tify before a New York County grand jury" challenged that grand
jury as unlawfully constituted because (1) New York's voluntary
system failed to attract minorities;77 (2) an age minimum of thirty-
five led to the underrepresentation of young people;" and (3) welfare
recipients were eliminated."
The detained witnesses first brought a claim in the federal courts
alleging violations of their civil rights.'" Both the District Court and
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that they lacked
jurisdiction."
Remanding the case to the New York courts, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit noted that "serious constitutional issues"
about New York's grand jury selection process had been raised. 2
Despite the Second Circuit's caution, the New York Court of Ap-
peals rejected the petitioners' claim that the state has "an affirma-
tive duty to provide a jury which was made up of a cross section of
72. Id. at 130, 85 N.E.2d at 902.
73. See Id. at 132-36, 85 N.E.2d at 902-04 (Desmond, J., and Fuld, J., dissenting). Judge
Desmond argued that the "course of conduct" was clearly discriminatory, and Judge Fuld
criticized the county's grand jury for failing to represent a "cross section of the community."
74. Id. at 131, 85 N.E.2d at 902.
75. 26 N.Y.2d 481, 260 N.E.2d 501, 311 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1970).
76. Id. at 485, 260 N.E.2d at 502-03, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
77. Id. at 488, 260 N.E.2d at 505, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
78. Id. at 486, 260 N.E.2d at 504, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
79. Id. at 491, 260 N.E.2d at 506, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
80. The original federal court action was brought under 28 U.S. C. A. § 1443(1). It alleged
that because minorities had been excluded from the grand jury, the state of New York had
violated the defendants' civil rights. Id. at 485, 260 N.E.2d at 503, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
81. Chestnut v. New York, 370 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
82. Id. at 7.
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the community . '.'.."83 The court reiterated its familiar
"intentional and systematic exclusion" rule,84 and found that al-
though it was "unfortunate"" that the voluntary system produced
an underrepresentation of minorities, the court held that this failure
"does not establish that there has been any unconstitutional dis-
crimination." 6
The court also upheld the constitutionality of eliminating persons
less than thirty-five years old and welfare recipients from grand jury
eligibility because the criteria had "reasonable justification."" The
thirty-five year age limit was used as a convenient way of eliminat-
ing persons who would not have had valuable petit jury experience. 8
The exclusion of welfare recipients was "apparently founded on an
assumption which may have been erroneous" that it was unlawful
for those persons to receive any additional state economic assis-
tance, including compensation for grand jury service.89
The petitioners then brought a writ for habeas corpus relief in the
federal courts." The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit interpreted the rationale for excluding welfare recip-
ients differently, but it upheld the Court of Appeals.9 Writing for
the court, Justice Kaufman found that the procedure was not con-
ducted in an "arbitrary and discriminatory manner," and, there-
fore, was constitutional. He rejected the petitioners' speculation
that the way in which grand jurors were selected produced an
"authoritarian" group which followed the prosecutor's lead.93
Those decisions have made challenges to grand jury panels ex-
tremely difficult, but not impossible.
B. A Successful Challenge
There is at least one case where an indictment has been over-
83. 26 N.Y.2d at 488, 260 N.E.2d at 505, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
84. Id. (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 490, 260 N.E.2d at 506, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 491, 260 N.E.2d at 506, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
90. United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Ct. of the City of New York, 442 F.2d 611
(2d Cir. 1971).
91. Id. at 618-19.
92. Id. at 617.
93. Id. at 616.
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turned because the grand jury was unconstitutionally impanelled.
In People v. Cosad, 4 a pre-Chestnut decision, a woman successfully
challenged a grand jury indictment on the basis of sexual discrimi-
nation. Although women had become eligible to serve on New York
grand juries in 1938,11 no woman's name had ever appeared on Se-
neca County's jury list." The judge found that "persons of the fem-
ale sex [had] been systematically excluded from service . . . in
violation of this defendant's constitutional rights" and overturned
her conviction. 7
C. Challenges to New York Grand Juries Since Chestnut
Cosad is notable as an exception to the general pattern in New
York. When defendants have alleged that they have been indicted
by grand juries which have failed to represent "a fair and impartial
cross-section of the citizens,""8 those defendants have been remarka-
bly unsuccessful, especially since the rigid requirements of past de-
cisions have been reaffirmed in Chestnut.
Courts correctly emphasize that they dislike overturning indict-
ments for "mere technicalities."" As the court explained in People
v. Block, "If indictments are to be dismissed as mere technicalities
which in no way affect the rights of the accused persons, no indict-
ment would ever be secure and would always be subject to at-
tack."'09 But, courts likewise refuse to overturn indictments even
where the legality of a grand jury is highly questionable. '0
In People v. Paciona, '02 the petitioner challenged an indictment
issued by an Erie County grand jury drawn from a venire of petit
jurors which had previously been adjudicated as unconstitutionally
94. 189 Misc. 939, 73 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Seneca County Ct. 1947).
95. Id. at 939-40, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
96. Id. at 940, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
97. Id., 73 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
98. In re Grand Jurors' Ass'n of Bronx Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
99. People v. Block, 190 Misc. at 82, 74 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
100. Id.
101. People v. Brophy, 304 N.Y. 391, 107 N.E.2d 504 (1952). In Brophy the petitioner
alleged that the prosecutor had "packed" the grand jury by excluding all potential jurors who
admitted knowing certain persons who might be involved in the pending investigations. The
petitioner further alleged that the judge had used secret information sheets describing pro.
spective jurors' backgrounds. On appeal, the court determined that "mere error, not resulting
in prejudice, is insufficient to invoke the power of the courts to look behind the indict-
ments . I. " d. at 393-94, 107 N.E.2d at 505.
102. 45 App. Div. 2d 462, 359 N.Y.S.2d 360 (4th Dep't 1974).
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impanelled.03 The court took judicial note of the defective selection
process, which produced an illegally constituted grand jury."4 The
petitioner waited for more than the procedural thirty days to assert
his claim, "I the court found no prejudice, and denied the request for
an extension of the time limit. 08 Although courts properly stress
that indictments should not be overturned for "mere technicali-
ties," the courts should not look for technicalities to defeat a defen-
dant's serious, substantive charge.
The constitutionality of that Erie County grand jury was also at
issue in People v. Skibinski. '17 The court denied Skibinski's motion
to dismiss-his perjury indictment,' and rejected defendant's claim
that an illegally constituted grand jury was incompetent to adminis-
ter a valid oath or to receive testimony. 09 The court read Paciona
to mean that "indictments returned by jurors from the alleged ille-
gally constituted pool were voidable rather than void . . . [and] it
cannot be said that the 1973 Grand Jury lacked all power to carry
out its lawful function." ' 0
Although New York courts are careful to acknowledge that the
sixth amendment protects a defendant's right'to appear before a
jury which is representative of the community,"' they are loath to
infer that any procedure in impanelling a grand jury is prejudicial
to the defendant."2 Courts are especially reluctant to construe ques-
tions to jurors by a judge or prosecutor as prejudicial or as an at-
tempt to "pack" a panel, and usually interpret any inquiries as an
103. People v. Attica Brothers, 79 Misc. 2d 492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1974). In this
case the Erie County Supreme Court had found that "there was systematic exclusion of
students as a class and a deliberate exclusion of woman constituting discrimination contrary
to law." Id. at 498, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
104. 45 App. Div. 2d at 464, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
105. Id. at 464-65, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
106. Id. at 465, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
107. 55 App. Div. 2d 48, 389 N.Y.S.2d 693 (4th Dep't 1976).
108. Id. at 52, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
109. Id. at 50, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
110. Id. (emphasis in opinion).
111. Id. at 49, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
112. An extreme example is People v. Reilly, 71 Misc. 2d 227, 335 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Dutchess
County Ct. 1972), where the'defendant was indicted for grand larceny for theft of IBM
property. Thirteen of the twenty'one' grand jurors who returned his indictment were employ-
ees of IBM or spouses of IBM employees. Reilly's challenge of the indictment was rejected
because, "This court cannot assume that the Grand Jury in this case was otherwise than
impartial, nor will the court assume that the Grand Jury was prejudiced against the defen-
dant because of its make-up." Id. at 228, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
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effort to assemble a fair group of jurors."3 It continues to be the
petitioner's onerous burden to prove deliberate exclusions of a par-
ticular group." 4
Although at least one court has expressed reservations about the
kind of grand jury venire which results from the use of volunteers
from the voter registration lists,"' the procedure has generally been
upheld despite the results."6 In People v. Cook, "7 a defendant who
had been charged with criminal activity on the Onondaga Indian
Reservation challenged the county's grand jury panel for systematic
exclusion of Indians."' He maintained that the exclusion occurred
because Indians did not vote,"' but the court rejected the argument
that non-voters could be considered a "'cognizable group' within
the community which may be the subject of prejudice."' 20
Several grand juries have been upheld despite purposeful exclu-
sion.' 2 ' In Queens County the county clerk sent grand jury sub-
poenas only to men because he speculated that women would choose
to exempt themselves,' 2 as they were formerly permitted to do.' 3
The court found the clerk's explanation that the practice was
"economical" to be reasonable and upheld the panel's constitution-
ality. "24
People v. Sicilianol is a more recent example of the courts' con-
tinuing reluctance to delve into the constitutional issue of a chal-
113. People v. Brophy, 304 N.Y. 391, 394-95, 107 N.E.2d 504 (1952); People v. John, 76
Misc. 2d 582, 584-85 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
114. People v. Chestnut, 26 N.Y.2d at 488, 260 N.E.2d at 505, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
115. People v. Thomas, 53 Misc. 2d 427, 278 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Onondaga County Ct. 1967).
"It is common knowledge that the percentage of persons entitled to qualify to be a voter and
who have registered is not great in light of the entire eligible adult population. . . . [TIhis
court has already held that such nonservice [by blacks] is not by any design or purposeful
action. However, the court does agree with defendant's counsel that, if a man is entitled to
be judged by his peers, then the present system must be analyzed and studied." Id. at 429,
378 N.Y.S.2d at 1006-07.
116. People v. Cook, 81 Misc. 2d 235, 244-45, 365 N.Y.S.2d 611, 620-22 (Onondaga County
Ct. 1975).
117. 81 Misc. 2d 235, 365 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975).
118. Id. at 243, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 245, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
121. See People v. Cender, 67 Misc. 2d 129, 323 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
122. Id. at 132, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
123. Former N.Y. JUD. LAW § 507.
' 124. 67 Misc. 2d at 132, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10.
125. 52 App. Div. 2d 408, 384 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1st Dep't 1976).
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lenge to the grand jury's composition. Even with the District Attor-
ney's stipulation that "it was the custom in Bronx County
systematically and intentionally to mail qualification notices to pro-
spective jurors based upon a fixed mathematical formula which
specifically discriminated against women . .. " (emphasis
added), 2 ' the court refused to accept the stipulation as a sufficient
"factual showing that the Grand Jury . . . was constituted ille-
gally."'' 7 Despite a strong dissent,2 8 the court decided, "We should
not extend ourselves to decide constitutional issues unless the re-
cord contains persuasive evidence."'29
Despite gross irregularities in the selection of many grand jury
panels, New York courts have consisently refused to overturn indict-
ments those panels have issued. It is difficult to determine what
kind of defect, if any, the courts would find sufficiently 'serious to
require that an indictment be overturned.
VI. Conclusion
Although the United States Supreme Court has stated that defen-
dants have a right to a jury composed of their "peers and equals,"'' "
many grand jury critics, and even some supporters, find that grand
jury panels frequently fail to conform to that ideal. Critics usually
charge that grand juries are disproportionately white, male, middle
class, and middle aged who are generally sympathetic to prosecu-
tors. This has led some commentators to suggest eliminating the
grand jury altogether, 3' while others have resigned themselves to
accepting that particular unfortunate result.'
It is neither necessary nor desirable to eliminate an historic part
of the Anglo-American legal system which includes citizen partici-
pation simply because of one serious, but manageable, defect. How-
ever, the discrepancy between the ideal and the reality of a jury
should be a matter of concern.
126. Id. at 409, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 994-95.
127. Id. at 409-10, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
128. "Classifications based upon sex . . . are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny." (Lupiano, J., dissenting). Id. at 418, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 1001. (emphasis in
opinion).
129. Id. at 410, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
130. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
132. See M. P. FRANKEL & G. P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY (1977).
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At the root of the problem is the type of grand jury panel which
results from the common practice of using voter registration lists
and volunteers to locate grand jurors. New York statutes already
provide practical alternatives. Telephone directories, city directo-
ries, and census lists are statutorily approved methods of selecting
potential jurors.' 3 These types of lists should provide access to al-
most all groups in the community.
In addition to this procedural change in the selection process,
there should be a change in the philosophy behind jury service.
Grand jury service by all citizens should not be viewed as the privi-
lege of citizens; instead, it should be considered a right of a defen-
dant.
Pearl Zuchlewski
133. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
